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rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PRICE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 16, 688

VS.

HAL FOUTZ, et ux.,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLAUTS

STATEMENT OF THE rTATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit in unlawful retainer against
defendants for possession of home and treble damages; together
with an action for the court determining ownership and immediate
possession of the residence together with a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs.

Defendant counterclair.Jed for specific performance

of contract or in the alternative to specific performance, damages,
both compensatory and punitive together with a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs.
DISPOSITION Ill LOWER COURT
The Honorable David Sam of the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, without a jury, ruled that the Earnest Money
Receipt was a clear,

u~ambigious

and final contract; that

plaintiff was entitled to ir:nnediate possession of the house and
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ordered defendants to vacate the residence; that defendants were
entitled to have returned the $10, 000. 00 down payment less

$350.~I

per month as rent for the premises during defendants' occupancy.
The court ruled that the Earnest Money Receipt was a final contraq
and that the defendants were in default.

The court further

ruled that defendants were guilty of unlawful detainer, that
plaintiff was entitled to treble damages but offset the treble
damages by reason of the increased value of the house since the
parties entered into the contract of sale.

The court allowed

an offset of plaintiff's damages against the $10,000.00 down
payment which defendants made on the house.

The court gave

defendants credit for $300.00 improvement on the yard, improvements in the house not to exceed $1,000.00 and awarded plaintiff

$1,550.00 in attorney's fee together with costs.

The court

ruled that 61-2-2 UCA, 1953, was not applicable.

The court

further ruled that the plaintiff had made full disclosure to
defendants and had not misrepresented the house.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the decision of the lower
court; to have this court determine that the Earnest Money Receipt
was not a final contract and that the parties should make and enter
into the final contract, with all of the terms, as provided for
in the Earnest Money Receipt.

Or in the alternative, to determine
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that under the facts plaintiff did misrepresent the house to
defendants,

that said misrepresentations were material.

Appellants

request this court to rule that the decision of the lower court
amounts to a wrongful unjust enrichment to plaintiffs of
approximately $15,000.00.

Appellants request this court to rule

that Title 61, UCA 1953 applies to the facts of this case and
that defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to damages.
STATEMEiH OF FACTS
The parties signed a Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
co Purchase, the printed form used by realtors, on November 29,
1977, at which time plaintiff sold to defendant a residence in
Orem, Utah, for the purchase price of $52,000.00, $600.00 which
was paid down as earnest money.

The Earnest Money Agreement

provided for rent at the rate of $350.00 a month to be paid
to Seller, plaintiff, until the final closing of the sale and
the final agreement between the parties.

Defendants paid the

rent and was having difficulty in selling their residence in
Las Vegas, Nevada, which was stated in said Earnest Money Receipt.
The earnest money payment of $600.00 was paid to the president
of plaintiff corporation, who was also a principal officer and
stockholder in the real estate broker involved.

The $600.00

earnest money was not placed into a trust account of either
the broker or the plaintiff.
On May 25, 1978, the parties signed a second Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the pre-printed form, at
which time appellants paid to respondents $10,000.00.

The second
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Earnest Money Receipt expressly stated that it superseded the
first Earnest Honey Receipt.

Again, the $10,000.00 was

delivered to Mr. Larry Price, president

of plaintiff and a

principal officer and stockholder in the real estate company
involved. (Ex. 1,

; TR 7, Line 10; TR 15, Line 3)

The Earnest

Money Receipt, Exhibit 1, was prepared by plaintiff's employee
and realtor agent. (TR 18)

The $10,000.00 payment made by

appellant to respondent went as a part payment on the lot of
the house in question and sold to appellants.

(TR 38, Line 13)

Hr. Lund, the real estate agent and employee of Larry Price,
President of respondent, informed appellants that Seller would
not pay the FHA or VA points on the house.

He specifically

told appellants that "they could probably finance the home FHA
if they were willing to make an offer at a higher price than
$52,000.00 list price." (TR 42, Lines 8-12) Mr. Lund, realtor,
agent and employee of the president of plaintiff corporation,
told Mr. Foutz that the residence in question would probably
qualify for an FHA or VA loan.

(TR 51, Line 14-17)

Appellants could not get conventional financing on
the house by reason of them opening a new self-employed business
in the State of Utah.

Appellants applied to approxinately

ten places for a conventional loan, as recorrnnended and assisted
by Mr. Lund, realtor, agent and e!'lployee of Larry Price, president
of plaintiff.

(TR 75, Line 5-10; 76, Line 18-21)

Appellants did not know that the house in question
would not qualify for VA or FHA loan on May 25, 1978, the signing
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of the Earnest Money Receipt, Exhibit 1, and would not have
purchased the house had appellants realized the house would
not qualify for VA or FHA loan.

Appellants pursued conventional

financing at the suggestion of Mr. Lund, plaintiff's realtor
and agent and relied upon Mr. Lund for the conventional financing.
(TR 97, Line 10-13)

The conventional loans did not materialize

because the conventional loan money at that time dried up.
(TR 98, Line 1,2)

Prior to and during the time of the trial

herein, appellants had applied for a VA or FHA loan and the
matter was being processed (TR 97, Line 14-26).

Appellants are

willing to pay any and all necessary discount points under the
law to qualify for VA or FHA by reason of increase in purchase
price or otherwise.

(TR 99, Line 4-7)

Appellants could have

borrowed money by reason of the value of the house in question
to pay any necessary additional costs of the VA or FHA discount
points.

(TR 104, Line 24-30; TR 105, Line 1)
The appraised valuation of the house in question on

August of 1978 was $58,000.00. (TR 105, Line 25)

Appellants

discovered the house would not qualify for FHA because it was
in a planned unit development and specific items must be done
to qualify said house for FHA financing.
TR 81, Line 25-30)

(TR 76, Line 19-21;

The value of the house at the time of the

trial was between $65,000.00 and $75,000.00.

(TR 49, Line 28-29)

Mr. Brian Crandall, one of the employees of plaintiff
and a witness of respondents, testified that prior to the signing
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of the Earnest Money Receipt, it was not disclosed to appellants
that the

house would not qualify for VA or FHA. (TR 122, Line 25-.1
Appellants tendered and offered to enter into a final

real estate contract, spelling out all of the terms and agreemen::
between the parties, but respondents failed and refused to do so
All during the negotiations, the sale, and the attet:'.lpts
for financing, the realtor-agent, Mr. Lund, was an enployee and
agent of Mr. Larry Price, president of plaintiff corporation;

Mr. Price having an interest in the real estate company involved
and being one of the owners of said real estate cor:ipany. (TR 36,
Line 7-21)
The earnest money payr:ients, both the $600.00 and
the $10,000.00 were not placed into a trust fund of the realtor
and there was no formal closing of the contract or the final
contract entered into.
Exhibit 1 attached to defendants' r:iemorandum of facts
and authorities on the above natter and entitled "Statement of
Cost and Irortgage Loan Required by Regulation Z" is the standard
application forr:i for FHA loans as used by First Security Bank
which is typical.

On said Exhibit 1, there is a specific provisi.:l

that states for a disclosure of the loan discount fee to be paid
by the buyer or the loan discount fee to be paid by the seller.
This is specific evidence on the standards and practice of the
financing trade and the FHA regulations.

Attached as Exhibit 2

to the same defendants' neaorandurn, is a copy of the rules and
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regulations of the State of Utah Real Estate License Law and
as having been adopted in Utah County as well as other counties
in the State of Utah.

Said regulations provide in part as follows:

l.

On Page 5, Paragraph 14C it provides for the broker
to prepare closing statements. This was not done
in the case now before the court.

2.

Paragraph 15 provides for the placing of 100% of
all funds belonging to others into a trust account
by brokers involved. This was not done in the
case pending before the court.

3.

Paragraph 25 provides that when the seller fails
or is unable to consurmnate the contract, the broker
has no right to any portion of the money deposited
by the buyer and relates specifically to earnest
money. This has not been done in the case now
pending before the court.

The Earnest Money

~eceipt

(Exhibit 1) calls for rent of

$350.00 per month. OnAugust 15, 1978, plaintiff sent a notice
to defendants unilaterally attempting to raise the rent to
$600.00 per month.
out of the house.

The purpose being to try to force defendant
(TR 49, Line 4-11)
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ARGUME:1T
POEH I
LOWER COURT ERR.ED U RULElG PLAJ:HIFF' S AGE;ffS NOT
"A REAL ESTATE BROKER" AilD rn A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY
AS DEFINED IN 61-2-2 UCA, 1953
Exhibit 1, the Earnest Money Receipt in question,
is a pre-printed form in this case prepared by and furnished
by the seller and his agents.

The Earnest Money Agreement

specifially provides on Line 33 that there will be either a
contract of sale or an instrument of conveyance; Line 39 that
it constitutes "the entire preliminary contract" and then goes
on further and stated "as further agreed that execution of the
final contract shall abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase."

It is clear from the language of the

Earnest Money Receipt and the intention of the parties that
the Earnest Honey Receipt is merely a prelimiriary agreement.
Prior to and during the course of the trial, appellants
offered to enter into a final agreement between the parties and
incorporating the provisions and Earnest i"!oney Receipt, the
oral discussions and particularly the question of discount points
for FHA or VA financing.
specific performance
final contract.

Appellants specifically

requested

to order the parties to enter into a

There are many items in the final contract

that will have to be specifically described that are not in
the Earnest Money Receipt.

The financing of the property is

still being worked on and appellants are not in default of the
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Earnest >loney Receipt.

They have been paying rent, parties

agreed that rent could be deducted from the $10,000.00 payment
by appellants to respondent.

Specific performance is an equitable

relief and under the facts of this case appellants are entitled
to equitable relief to conclude the purchase between the parties.
The purchase price has been defined, the fact that
respondent is getting rent until the installment payments or
lump sum paynents are made protects the respondent from any loss.
The failure of respondent to inform appellants that the house
would not qualify for FllA or VA and the fact that respondent's
agents steered appellants to conventional financing is the reason
for the delay in the final contract and payments to which respondent
is entitled.
In Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P2d 597, this
court ruled that an Earnest Money Recei,t was a binding contract
that can be specifically enforced, under the facts of that case.
Appellants seek to enforce the Earnest Money Receipt provisions
together with the other provisions not mentioned in said Earnest
Money Receipt.

This fact situation before the court graphically

illustrates the necessity for final contracts as provided for
and which may be enforced under these Earnest lfoney Receipts.
Failure to specifically enforce the contract of appellants constitutes
unjust enrichment to the respondent in the sum of approximately
$15,000.00.

Appellants have performed and are continuing their

perforoance under the agreeoent between the parties.

The delays

in the closing is a result of the failure to disclose and misinformation furnished appellants by respondent and its agents.
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POINT II
LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING PLAINTIFF A~m HIS AGENTS
DID i:i"OT BREACH A FIDUCIARY DUTY IN FAILING TO
PLACE PAYMENTS ItlTO TRUST ACCOUNT AS PROVIDED FOR
EJ 61-2-11 UCA, 1953; AND ERRED FAILHlG TO AWARD
PEHALTY PROVISION AGAINST PLAINTIFF AS PROVIDED
IN 61-2-17 UCA, 1953.
61-2-2 UCA, 1953, defines"real estate broker" and
states in part as follows: "

. . the term "real estate

broker" shall also include any person, partnership, association
or corporation employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners
of lots or other parcels of real estate . .

This section

makes an exception to some isolated sales and where you are
your own owner and selling your mm property.

The evidence

before this court clearly discloses that Mr. Price does not
have an interest in the licensed real estate broker involved,
Courtesy Real Estate; that Mr. Price was the contractor that
built the house and his representative, Hr. Lund, was the individua
working with appellants for the financing.
The evidence discloses that the original $600.00 on
the first Earnest Money Receipt was not placed into a trust
account nor was the $10, 000. 00 payr.1ent made by appellants to
respondents.
61-2-11 UCA 1953, has provision for the requirement
of depositing earnest money and down payments in trust account
of the real estate broker.

It describes that failure to do so

is grounds for revocation or suspension of the license of the
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broker.
The section further discusses that there must be
adequate records of these transactions, how the trust funds
are held and whether used by the builder, the amounts of the
commissions and to whom the proceeds were disbursed.
no evidence before the court that this has been done.

There is
See

Reese vs. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P2d 410, as distinguished
in 10 Utah 2d 930, 297; 353 P2d 989; and 29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P2d
542, which hold as follows:
"A broker has the responsibility of honestly and
fairly representing those who engage his services
and because of this specialized service the broker
offers as an agent for his client, there arises
a fiduciary agreeoent between them."
The State of Utah Real Estate License Law Rules and
Regulations specifically provide under 61-2-5(b) that there shall
be closing statements, that the broker shall be held responsible
for correctness of all closing statements; it further provides
for a trust account to be used for all down payment, earnest
monies, costs, rents, payments on contracts, mortgages, etc.
"The said trust account shall at all times contain 100% of all
funds belonging to others."

(See Paragraph 15 of the printed

brochure, which is attached to appellants' memorandum on file.)
Paragraph 25 of said regulation and laws specifically provides
in part:

"When for any reason seller fails or is unable to

consunnnate a contract, the broker has no right to any portion
of the money deposited with him by the buyer."
It is clear as to the importance of these rules and
regulations, which have not been followed and have been refused
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by respondents, their agents and the realtors involved.

There

has been a total of $10,600.00 in down payments made upon the
property as well as rent paid by appellants at the rate of
approxir.iately $350.00 a month since November, 1977, to and
including the present time by reason of cash payments and credits
agreed upon toward the $10,000.00 payment made to respondent;
all as agreed upon between the parties.

Hone of these funds

have been trust funded as required by law.

The importance

of this regulation is pointed out in this case before the court
to require the parties to enter into a final contract.

The

final contract in this case would avoid the problems of failure
to disclose the financibility of the house in question and
avoid many problems for all parties.

Respondent refuses to enter

into the final contract for the reason that they are getting rent
on the property, and are receiving the equivalent of a forfeiture of $15,000.00 in increased value to the house in questioo.
61-2-11, UCA 1953, specifically requires rent, earnest
monies, down payments, payments on contracts, all to be placed
into a trust account until the final contract between the
parties is entered into.

This has not been done in the case beforel
I

the court.

All of the parties would be strongly motivated to

'

enter into thefinal contract if these funds had been deposited
on trust, the final contract entered into and the closing are
required by law performed.

See 61-2-2, UCA 1953; 61-2-11, UCA 1951\

61-2-17, UCA 1953; 61-2-5(b), UCA 1953.
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POEJT III
LOWER COURT ERRED FAILHlG TO FIND MISREPRESENTATION AS
TO FINAi'lCIBILITY OF HOUSE A~m DEFE@ANTS' RIGHT TO DAMAGES
AS A RESUl.T THEREOF.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LOHER COURT
ERRED TO GRANT SPECIFIC PERFO~TCE IN THE FORM OF A FINAL
CONTRACT OF SALE BE':'HEEN THE P&."lTIES AND THEREFORE CAUSED
UNJUST ENRIC!-IMENT TO DEFE~WANTS.

Mr. Lund, Agent of Respondent, specifically testified
that prior to the signing of the Earnest Money Agreement in
question,

that he nor none of the agents or representatives

of respondent informed the appellants that the house would not
then qualify for FHA or VA; and that it probably would qualify.
Appellants testified that they relied upon their understanding
that tne house would qualify for FHA or VA loans; that they
preferred FHA or VA loans but that respondent's agents kept
encouraging them and steering them towards conventional laons
at a tioe when the conventional loan money had dried up.
Appellants specifically testified that they would not have
purchased the house had they known that the house would not
qualify for FHA or VA loans.

This is a specific example of

failure to disclose the fact that the house did not qualify but
they were informed that it probably would qualify.

As a direct

result of reliance upon this misrepresentation, the proper
financing and loans were not closed or obtained.

The evidence

is clear that these applications are still pending before FHA
and VA.

The elements of misrepresentation, to wit, false

statements, material fact, reliance upon, and damage, are all
present in the case now before this court.
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As a direct result of this material fact and misrepresentation, appellants have been damaged by the amount of
the money that they have paid in the form of rent, payments of
$10,600.00, and a loss of increase in the value of the home
in approximately $15,000.00.
Appellants are clearly entitled to damages as provided
for in Title 61 for failure to trust fund the payments, together
with all other damages, which were tendered in the form of
evidence at the time of the trial of this matter in the lower
court.

The lower court erroneous ruled that the unlawful

detainer, Title 78, Chapter 36, UCA 1953, applied; in that
this was not a landlord-tenant situation but was a seller and
buyer relationship in which the buyer agreed to pay rent during
the term of the preliminary contract.

The damages requested

were in the alternative to specific performance of the final
contract of sale between the parties.
Under the evidence, appellants, the buyer, could and
would have paid any and all discount points for FHA.

This is

another item that needed to be placed in the final contract
between the parties and which was some of the many discussions
on the subject matter.
POitlT IV
LOWER COURT ERRED rn A\JARDIHG ATTORNEY FEES
TO PLArnTIFF
The contract between the parties was enforceable and
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still in force and effect without default on the part of
appellants.

Rent had been paid in the form of cash and, as

agreed beti;1een the parties, credits of $351). 00 per month upon
the $10,000.00 payment by appellant to respondent.

The matter

was not "closed" for the reason that the final contract had
not been entered into or proposed.

Appellants proferred a

final contract prior to cornmenceoent of suit.

The VA and FHA

loan applications are still pending and were at the time of
the comr;iencewent of suit.

Title 78, Chapter 36, UCA, unlawful

detainer, does not apply to a buy and sell agreeoent; this
not being a landlord-tenant situation even though rent was
being paid until the contract was finalized and closed.
The parties had, by their conduct, waived the strict time for
closing the contract particularly where respondent refused
to enter into a final contract, which was required.
There being no default on the part of appellants,
the court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs.

To the

contrary, respondents refu~ed to enter into a final contract,
misled appellants on the financing and created the problems
complained of.

Their conduct clearly amounts to an unjust

enrichment which equity forbids.
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The lower court erred in ruling that the unlawful
detainer statute applied where in fact there has been and was
an enforceable sale between the parties.

The lower court

erred in construing the Earnest Money Receipt as the final
contract between the parties when it expressly, under its
terms, provides for a final contract to be entered into between
the parties including the financing arrangements or installment
payments to be made under the final contract.

The facts of

this case clearly demonstrate appellants are entitled to
specific

perfo~ance

of the Earnest Money Receipt and the

entering into a final contract.

Respondent

wrongfully refused

to enter into a final contract.
The conduct of the parties waived any specific
time element particularly where agents for respondents misrepresented and misled appellants in trying to obtain financing.
Title 61 UCA, 1953, applies in the case now before
this court.

Respondent

trust fund the

pa~ents

funds unlawfully.
herein.

and

its

agents clearly failed to

made by appellants and disbursed the

This has specifically damaged appellants

I

A!Jpellants have suffered damages, if specific performance

is notgranted,in the sum of $10,600.00 in installment

pa~ents

together with loss in value of the house in the sum of approximate'
$15,000.00, together with attorney's fee and costs and provided
for in the Earnest Money Receipt.
reversible error.

The lower court has committed

I

Appellants are entitled to specific performance!
I
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of the Earnest Money Receipt or in the alternative the damages
herein described.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

of December, 1979.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that two true and exact copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants were mailed to
Richard S. Dalebout, Attorney for Respondent, 60 East 100 South,
Provo, Utah

84601, postage prepaid, this

J}~ay

of December,

1979.
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